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AN OVERVIEW OF THE FCPA
Wallace Timmeny*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 (FCPA) really started
with Watergate. The Special Prosecutor had investigated a
number of illegal campaign contributions by American corporations.2 The role of the prosecutor, however, was limited to determining whether the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 602 of the Federal
Criminal Code had been violated by these contributions. We at the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were watching the
Special Prosecutor, and were intrigued by the devices the corporate community had used to get the funds for the contributions
out of the corporate arena, away from corporate books. To satisfy
our curiosity, we filed motions to obtain Grand Jury transcripts of
the Prosecutor's investigations. After obtaining some of these
Grand Jury transcripts, the first thing we found was that these
large contributions were coming from slush funds that were maintained off the books of the various corporations. It seemed that
one of the principal devices for setting up the slush funds was payment through a foreign agent or a consultant who would, in turn,
return the money to the corporation, allowing the corporation to
set up an off-the-book fund. We also learned that only a very small
part of the money that was going into these funds was coming
back for campaign contributions. The rest, it seemed, was remaining in the hands of the agents and was being used for what we
eventually called "questionable payments," or in some cases actual
bribes, in order to obtain and retain business overseas.
Having seen this as the problem, the enforcement staff of the
SEC tried to determine just what it was that this meant to the
public investor, the shareholder in a public company. We came up
with a number of theories that we thought would have to be em• Former Deputy Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC. Presently a partner of
Kutak, Rock and Huie, Washington, D.C.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Appendix I, infra.
2. See Foreign and Corrupt Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
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ployed in analyzing this problem. The first theory was that the investor had a right to know if the company's books were being tampered with; it seemed clear, we thought, that the investor had a
right to know that there was a possibility of a dishonest accounting. We also thought that an investor had a right to know if management was using his money to violate either U.S. or foreign
laws. We also believed that an investor had the right to know
when and how management was obtaining significant lines of business thr<;mgh bribery, or was subjecting the company to risks of
losing significant lines of business if the bribery activities of the
company were discovered. Finally, we believed an investor had a
right to know of management stewardship of corporate assets if
that stewardship involved the outlay of millions of dollars to consultants with no accountability for the consultants' use of the
funds.
We did not, however, make moral judgments about the corporations and what they were doing. We tried to separate morality
and the law- a difficult task. We did not make a determination
that a corporation was good or bad. We felt only that we were enforcing the applicable provisions of the federal securities laws. If
an overseas activity resulted in a possible loss of business, or if it
indicated that the corporation was not making an honest accounting to its shareholders, then we made a determination as to
whether that activity was material to the shareholders. If we
thought that it was material, we recommended an enforcement action.
In the early days when we were drafting some of the complaints in the first cases, the seeds were planted for the FCP A as
we now know it. For example, the first thing we did when we
drafted our complaints in these cases was to seek an injunction
against the falsification of books and records. At that time there
was no requirement that companies maintain accurate books and
records, but we sought injunctions against false entries. 3 That was
the seed for section 13(b)(2)(a) of the Exchange Act. 4
In addition, we also drafted some language concerning internal controls in the early pleadings. This arose from an incident
that occurred when we confronted a company that had entered on
its books enormous payments to foreign agents and consultants, in
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).

4. Id.
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contrast to those companies that paid agents through off-thebooks slush funds. The company argued that it could not be charged
with preparing false books and records, although it conceded it did
not know how the agents and consultants had used the payments.
In response to this, I suggested that we charge the company with
failing to disclose that payments were made to consultants and
agents without adequate records and controls to ensure that the
services performed by the agents, if any, were commensurate
with the amounts paid. That was the seed for the internal controls
provisions for the FCPA. 5 And later, as part of the FCPA, the idea
became a more vigorous and refined legal concept.
It is important to mention that, at the same time, the SEC
was very concerned about the magnitude of the problem. It appeared to be impossible to handle all of these apparently questionable payments as enforcement cases; there was a serious question
as to whether the SEC could bring enforcement cases in every instance. The commission did not want to continue exclusively along
the enforcement tack, so they came up with what was called the
voluntary program: 6 if a company were to do its own investigation
and come in and discuss disclosure and stop doing whatever they
were doing, there might be less necessity to bring an enforcement
case. It was not an immunity program, but it was a mechanism to
separate the big problems from the little problems. About 400
companies came in and disclosed that they had had problems.
Without getting into all the details of the so-called voluntary
program, it was clear that the problem was of such magnitude that
something else had to be done. That is when the Congress came into
the picture. 7 Two Congressmen in particular were interested in
what was going on, Senator Church and Senator Proxmire. Both
decided that more had to be done because the enforcement approach was not sufficiently prophylactic. They vigorously urged
the Justice Department to get involved and to bring a number of
criminal cases, and Senator Proxmire began to think in terms of a
statute that would preclude foreign payments.
At the same time, there were the foreign policy concerns. One
American company had allegedly paid bribes in excess of forty
5. Section 102 of the FCPA requires that issuers "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
6. See Stevenson, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50 (1976).
7. Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime,
20 HARV. INT'L L .J. 293, 295 (1979).
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million dollars in Italy. In fact, the Italian government nearly collapsed as a result of the activities of American companies.
Another company had allegedly enaged in conduct in Japan that resulted in the Japanese government toppling. There were also the
scandals in the Netherlands where Prince Bernhard was allegedly
on the payroll of an American company. Concerns were expressed
that our government was faced with foreign policy determinations
or decisions being made by American corporations. In other
words, some of our corporations were affecting foreign policy and
there was also the overriding concern that the whole idea of
foreign payments or corruption in business was really putting an
arrow in the bow of the countries that oppose our system. It gave
other countries the opportunity to argue that our system is based
on corruption. Finally, there was a concern that U.S. business
did not know what was good for itself, and to continue along these
lines, relying on bribery, was not in the best interest of U.S.
business. We had to develop the strength to compete based on
quality of product and not on our ability to make a payment in a
black bag. 8
At the time Congress became very active, the SEC was sort
of a reluctant dragon. The Commission thought that it had the
authority to adopt rules or to bring enforcement action, so as not
to have to seek a statute that actually prohibited foreign
payments. When the Commission saw that there would be a
FCPA, however, it sought a very strong statute.
The Ford Administration at the time took an approach to the
statute that has variously been described as cool, lukewarm, and
tepid. The Ford Administration did not vigorously seek a statute
that prohibited foreign payments, but rather, advocated a statute
that would only require disclosure of a company's foreign
payments. The company would make the disclosure with the Commerce Department, the Interior Department or any Department
except the Justice Department or the SEC. At that time, in the atmosphere carried over from Watergate, a mild dose of disclosure
was not hailed as a measure likely to produce a lasting cure. What
came out of the legislative process was the FCP A as we now know
it.9

8. See George & Dundas, Responsibilities of Domestic Corporate Management
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 865, 868 n. 9 (1980).
9. See note 1 supra.
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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Provisions

The Act as adopted had antibribery provisions 10 and accounting provisions. 11 On the antibribery side, the FCP A first, through
section 103, added a new section 30A to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. That section and its prohibition applied to issuers, that
is, companies that are public companies who file reports with the
SEC. 12 Also, section 104 adopted antibribery provisions and prohibitions that extended to what were known as domestic
concerns. 13 Domestic concerns were defined in the Act as anything
other than reporting companies. A partnership, a Massachusetts
trust, or an individual, for example, could be a domestic concern.
Section 104 extended the same prohibitions as section 103 to
domestic concerns.
The issuers and the domestic concerns were prohibited from
making, authorizing or promising payments or gifts of anything of
value to a foreign official, party or party official or candidate, or to
any person that the issuer or the domestic concern knew or had
reason to know would pass along the money to a foreign official or
to a political party or to a member of a political party. Thus, there
were prohibitions on payments to officials, political parties, and
third persons, with reason to know that the payments will be passed along. The prohibitions went to the making of payments to influence a government official in some official act or to induce him
to use his influence with his government to obtain or retain
business, or to direct business for the company making the payment. There is no de minimus standard in the statute; it applies to
anything of value. 14
Note that a facilitating payment to move goods or to get an
import license, or something that the company is entitled to in a
country, was not prohibited. That was done not by specifying that
those payments were allowed, but by defining a foreign official to
exclude a ministerial official, or low level employee in an agency .15
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. V 1981).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. V 1981).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (Supp. V 1981).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
14. See Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities and International Finance
and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 84-6 (1981).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
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That a payment had to be made to obtain or retain business, or be
directed to someone for those purposes, is an important concept
because the argument can be made that payments to get tax legislation or some sort of a regulatory benefit in a country might not
be included within the provisions of the statute.
Still another point to note is that jurisdictional means had to
be used in order to violate the statute. The jurisdictional means,
such as the mails or other instrumentality, need only be used in
furtherance of the payment, not the actual making of payment. If
one were to use the jurisdictional means to cover up payment or to
send a message to get to the point where one was going to make
an improper payment, that could well be in furtherance of the payment.
The accounting provisions apply only to companies whose
securities are registered under the 1934 Act. The first accounting
provision under section 104 of the FCP A put a new section 13(b)(2)
into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This section has a provision that all issuers have to make and keep books and records and
accounts, which in reasonable detail reflect transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer. The FCP A also added section
13(b)(2)(B) to the 1934 Act, a section which deals with internal controls. The provision requires that all issuers have to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in accordance with management's authorization; that transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements and to maintain accountability for assets; that access to
assets is permitted only in accordance with management authorization; and that recorded accountability is compared to existing
assets at reasonable intervals, with appropriate steps taken to correct any differences.
The internal control provisions, 16 therefore, are designed to
deal with the problems of off-the-books slush funds or company
employees going beyond company policy and using corporate
assets to make payments, or whatever, in a way the management
would not want them used. They were also designed to ensure
that there are controls on the company assets- that a company
knows what assets it has and that management is aware of what is
going on within a company concerning its assets. After the statute
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
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was adopted and signed into law, the SEC adopted rules to further
the purposes of the FCP A. 17 One rule adopted by the SEC prohibits the falsification of the books and records that are required
to be kept under the FCP A. The other rule adopted by the Commission prohibits an officer or director from making a materially
false or misleading statement or omitting to state a material fact
to accountants or auditors in connection with audits or filings.
B.

Enforcement Responsibilities

An important feature of the statute is that it is administered
dually by the Justice Department and by the SEC. The SEC has
civil enforcement responsibility for the accounting provisions, and
the Justice Department has criminal enforcement responsibilities
for the accounting provisions. The SEC has civil enforcement responsibility for the antibribery provisions that apply to issuers. 18
The Justice Department has civil enforcement responsibilities
with respect to the antibribery provisions that apply to domestic
concerns, and criminal responsibility with respect to antibribery
provisions that apply to issuers and domestic concerns. 19 Thus, administration was carefully thought out to give the SEC responsibility for issuers who file reports with the SEC, and the Justice
Department responsibility for the domestic concerns that do not
file with the SEC. The FCP A maintains a traditional approach, as
the SEC has no criminal authority in any arena and can only investigate and refer criminal matters to the Department of Justice.

III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In the four years since the FCP A has been in effect, there has
been a great rush to shore up internal controls. There has been a
great debate about what is meant by some of the terms in the statute, such as what is meant by "reasonable detail" with respect to
keeping books and records, or what is meant by "reasonable assurances" with respect to internal controls requirements. 20 A committee of the American Bar Association put out a guide with respect to
the accounting provisions, stating, in general, that if the questionable conduct does not impact upon financial statements, then it is

17.
18.
19.
20.

Rule 13(b)(l)-(2), 44 FED. REG. 10, codified in 17 C.F .R. § 240.13(b)2-1 (1982).
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1978).
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
See supra note 15.
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beyond the reach of the accounting provisons. 21 The staff of the
SEC countered with the argument that Congress intended the accounting provisions not to apply narrowly to financial statement
preparation, but rather to apply broadly to bolster or rehabilitate
corporate accountability in light of the questionable payments
scandals. The result of the differing ABA and SEC staff views has
been a shooting match that has flared up on and off for years at
seminars and ABA meetings.
With the antibribery provisions, the difficulty has become the
problem of dealing with agents overseas. The provision states that
a payment to a third party, with knowledge or with reason to
know that the third party is going to pass the money on to a
foreign official, is illegal. The problem arises with the definition of
"reason to know." That is a concept that is going to be applied
with hindsight. Many companies groped for safeguards that would
withstand investigation at some later stage. Procedures have been
developed over the years to try and help people who have to deal
with the "reason to know" provision. For example, lawyers recommend that companies use a certain amount of diligence to investigate the qualifications and background of an agent, to outline his
duties, and to set up a mechanism to monitor his activities. In
essence, companies have been advised to record and document
their efforts to demonstrate that they have operated in good faith.
Good faith is the antithesis of corruption, thus, when a company
documents its efforts to determine who the agents were and so
forth, it establishes good faith and cuts against the argument that
anything might have been done corruptly. There are obviously
problems where foreign government officials double as businessmen and that conduct is not prohibited in their countries. Though
such problems can be dealt with, it is sometimes difficult.
The Justice Department, with respect to the FCP A, has a review procedure through which a company can seek to get some
assistance, and can determine whether or not the Justice Department will prosecute on a given set of facts. The Justice Department stated that it would not prosecute a company where a government official who represented a company, and at the same time
had an official function with respect to the company's activities,

21. ABA Comm. on Corp. Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2)
Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LA w. 307 (1978).
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isolated himself from any official decision affecting his client company. The Department, however, has stated that its position is not
to be viewed as a precedent.
In any event, the tougher problems come along when there is
sufficient time to utilize the review procedure, such as the last
minute demand from a government official to a company to pay a
commission of X percent to an agent new to the transaction. The
company, faced with complying with the demand or the loss of
business, has a serious problem under the statute. It has been my
experience that the business community in this country recognizes the problem and aborts transactions like that. The company
will usually walk away even though it may be at a substantial cost
to their shareholders.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In general, as a result of ambiguities in the books and records
provisions, and the very rigorous antibribery provisions, the cry
has gone out that the statute is destroying our ability to compete
overseas, and has destroyed or decreased our exports. There is
also a complaint that aids, such as the Justice Department review
procedure, are too little, too late. Companies do not want to become laboratory experiments for determining how some of the
terms are going to be interpreted. Finally, there is a complaint
that the costs of compliance are so great, and the burden so great
that foreign transactions are just not worth the effort, so they are
aborted. There has been a great deal of evidence from Senate
hearings on potential amendments of the FCP A, that the Act is
difficult to live with.
The cries about ambiguity or the potential for uneven enforcement are seriously overdone. In my view, the enforcement
record of the SEC and the Justice Department has been extremely
modest. In the four years since the FCP A has been passed, only a
handful of cases have been prosecuted. Cases brought under the
accounting provisions of the FCP A have been very straightforward. For example, officials of a company had collected the proceeds of a public offering and used them for personal purposes.
The SEC brought an action, maintaining the company violated the
internal controls provisions and the books and records provisions
of the FCP A. In another case, officers of a public company had
allegedly paid themselves a travel expense every day, for a two
year period, during which they actually spent a lot of time at
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home. So the Commission brought a case charging violation of the
accounting provisons. In another case, the Commission was concerned that a public company was not making its filings under the
1934 Act, and so sent out staff to find out why. The staff found
that the company did not have any books and records, so it could
not make any reports. The Commission brought charges of violations of the accounting provisions.
These are not examples of earthshaking cases or cases involving difficult interpretive issues. 22 As to the antibribery provisions,
no more than four or five cases have been brought in four years.
Thus, the enforcement of the FCP A has not been extreme. In any
event, there is a strong movement to amend the statute. There are
ambiguities in the FCPA; we now have experience with it, and it
can stand amendment. This amendment process is under way now.
22. See generally Timmeny, International Aspects of the Accounting Provisions of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 360 CORP. L. & PRAC. 53 (1981).
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